the streets of America. The motive is fear of war, rather than love of peace. The simple fact is, that they are actually prolonging the war abroad by encouraging our enemies; and promoting conflict at home, by inviting violent elements to argue.

The irony is astonishing.

While riots rage in the streets, while buildings burn to the ground, while murders multiply, scores of advertisers seem determined to ignore it. Despite the fact that their dollars are paying to promote the vicious tirades of a troupe of assassins, they go on dumping their customers' and shareholders' dollars into the attack upon themselves.

The conclusion is inescapable:

Advertisers have a social reponsibility, as well as a corporate duty. Since the dollars they spend support statements by others, the advertiser has not only a right—but a duty—to know who is saying what, with his shareholders money.

Substantial advertising can help legitimize the most unsavory editorial content. Ramparts, the Nihilist magazine which has campaigned to discredit the C.I.A., is a case in point. Displayed on their back cover is an ad which appears at first glance to be a General Motors insertion. Upon close inspection, it turns out to be sponsored by a small car leasing company in the East. On another occasion, Ramparts gave an air line its back page free, for three issues.

Thus does advertising camouflage editorial content.

It is high time—today, not tomorrow—for advertisers to demand that media live up to their responsibilities.

A free press means just that. If a few faceless, nameless slanderers have the right to promote drugs, ridicule religion, rationalize racism, endorse anarchy, legitimize lies and generally degrade and destroy our society; then the majority of honorable advertisers and responsible reporters have a right to retaliate.

We at Schick are proud to have fought for what we believe. But we are prouder still to have each of you fighting beside us.

So to the award winners, my warmest gratitude and sincerest compliments for a job well done. And to the guests and well-wishers here today, my deepest gratitude for your solid support and constancy.

FUTURE U.S. TRADE POLICY—TESTIMONY OF DAVID ROCKEFELLER, PRESIDENT, CHASE MANHATTAN BANK

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I invite the attention of the Senate to the outstanding testimony given before the Joint Economic Committee on July 20 by David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhattan Bank, on the subject of future U.S. trade policy. The Joint Economic Committee on that day concluded 6 days of hearings on this subject, during which it heard from some of the most outstanding Government, business, and academic leaders in the country. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Representative HALE BOGGS, deserves to be commended for organizing these hearings.

Mr. Rockefeller's testimony will be most valuable to the committee's consideration and recommendations regarding future U.S. trade policy.

I call particular attention to Mr. Rockefeller's suggestion that the United States reconsider its attitude toward the feasibility of regional free trade organizations in which the United States itself would be a member, specifically, a Canadian-United States free trade area, an arrangement which in time might include Great Britain, Mexico, and other countries.

For some time I have favored a careful examination of such a free trade area, and I am a member of a committee which is now doing just that. I am very much pleased that Mr. Rockefeller, based on independent evidence available to him, has come to a position similar to mine on this question.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD the statement given by Mr. Rockefeller before the Joint Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy.

The being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY DAVID ROCKEFELLER, PRESIDENT, THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, BEFORE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, WASHINGTON, JULY 20, 1967

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee: For the record, my name is David Rockefeller. I am President and Chairman of the Executive Committee of The Chase Manhattan Bank.

I appreciate very much, indeed, the invitation to appear before a group which, in my opinion, is contributing significantly to better public understanding of United States trade policies in the wake of the most sweeping tariff reductions in the history of internatonal trade.

The subject that engages your attention also holds special interest for me for two reasons: first, because it is so directly relevant to what I regard as the major challenges of our time; second, because a good part of my own life has ben devoted to studying various aspects of world trade, though I hasten to add that I assert no claim whatever to expert knowledge in this enormously complex area.

Over the past two weeks, you have heard testimony from a number of illustrious witnesses about the impact of the world-wide lowering of tariffs. At this early date, any technical evaluation of the over 6,000 U.S. tariff changes is impossible and must await detailed analysis. But a good guess might be that as a direct result of the Kennedy Round, U.S. exports and imports will rise by around 5%, with the gain spread over a period of five years or more.

This relatively modest percentage impact translates into an increase of close to $3 billion in total U.S. foreign trade. So you can readily see what it could bring in terms of export opportunities as well as somewhat stiffer import competition. In some instances, substantial adjustments may be required. For this reason, I fully support President Johnson's proposal to improve the adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Expansion Act, so that both industry and labor will find it easier to obtain prompt and adequate aid if adversely affected by the tariff cuts.

The great promise of the Kennedy Round, as I see it, is the effective increase in export opportunities brought about by the reciprocal reductions in foreign tariffs. I feel strongly that U.S. businessmen should approach the results in this affirmative manner, seeking to supply new foreign markets rather than worrying about greater import competition at home. And, it seems to me, the expanded opportunities for additional sales abroad should outweigh any adverse import competition, resulting in a net benefit to our balance of payments.

For one thing, the roughly reciprocal tariff reductions should assist U.S. trade more than that of Western Europe if only because we start out from the competitive advantage of running a substantial trade surplus—something on the order of $4 billion this year. Even if U.S. imports were to increase by a larger percentage than exports, our trade balance could improve.

The Kennedy Round tariff cuts will reduce the inherently discriminatory impact of the European trade blocs. Eight years ago, when European countries began to eliminate tariffs among themselves, exporting from the United States became relatively more difficult. But the lower the external tariffs of the European trade blocs, the smaller will be their discriminatory impact. Indeed, the major reason President Kennedy proposed the Trade Expansion Act in 1961, you will recall, was to reduce the European Common Market's diversionary effect on world trade. This goal has been largely accomplished in industrial, if not in agricultural, products.

In looking ahead, one might suppose that another round of international tariff negotiations could provide a still further boost to world trade, and that U.S. policy should continue to pursue the goal of multilateral tariff reductions.

However, I suspect that the Kennedy Round is likely to be the last such worldwide traiff-cutting session for some time. The Geneva negotiations—long drawn out and often acrimonious as they were—indicated there would be little further scope for another similar exercise soon. Tariff levels are now quite low, averaging an estimated 8% on industrial products in the United States and Western Europe. So further cuts would probably provide a comparatively smaller overall stimulus to trade than the present reduction.

What's more, new reductions in the remaining tariffs could prove more difficult to secure. These tariffs often constitute important special protection, with strong domestic interests opposing any further cuts. In addition, there could well be an absolute resistance on the part of regional trade blocs—both in Western Europe and elsewhere—to preserve at least minimal external tariffs since preferential treatment within the blocs was the main incentive for their establishment in the first place.

My feeling, therefore, is that additional general tariff reductions along the lines of the recent Kennedy Round are not in the cards. To be sure, further progress in tariff-cutting can and should be made. I am very much in favor of providing the Government with some type of negotiating authority to carry out minor adjustments. This could include possible elimination of so-called nuisance tariffs—those which are already below 2% and which serve only to increase administrative costs. But no new general tariff reductions seem feasible in the foreseeable future.

This means that after six rounds of GATT negotiations since the Second World War, U.S trade policy will most likely face in the years ahead a completely different set of policy issues from those of the past. In my view, three of these issues merit special attention.

First, the problem of non-tariff barriers which, after the Kennedy Round, remain the most serious obstacles to trade expansion.

Second, the demand of many less developed countries for some kind of preferential tariff treatment.

Third, *the pattern of U.S. trade relations with Canada*, a particularly compelling issue in view of the steady expansion of regional trade arrangements in other parts of the world.

In the area of non-tariff barriers, some headway was made in the Kennedy Round, most notably the successful negotiation of an anti-dumping code, and modification of certain European trade restrictions as part of the agreement to eliminate the American Selling Price valuation of some chemical imports. But other important non-tariff bar-